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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), which prohibits bribery 
of non-U.S. government officials, was born of a policy judgment that U.S. per-
sons, U.S. companies, and businesses that avail themselves of regulated U.S. 
capital markets should not profit from overseas corruption.1 It is one of several 
Mr. Diamant is a partner, Mr. Sullivan is counsel, and Mr. Smith is a senior associate at 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP in Washington, D.C.  The authors wish to thank their colleague, as-
sociate Claire Chapla, for her substantial assistance with this article.  
1. See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L. J.
929, 1009–10 (2012).
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U.S. criminal laws that extends to conduct beyond the United States’ borders.2
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have enforced the FCPA aggressively, impos-
ing billions in corporate fines and penalties.  Today, many companies operating 
overseas prioritize FCPA compliance and are increasingly investing in policies, 
procedures, and professionals aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to 
FCPA-related issues.
In its forty-two years of existence, the FCPA has attracted critics who be-
lieve that the FCPA handicaps U.S. companies by making it more difficult for 
them to compete against foreign companies not restricted by the law.  For in-
stance, President Donald Trump, in his previous life as a business mogul, once 
called the FCPA a “horrible law [that] should be changed” because it puts U.S. 
businesses at a “huge disadvantage” compared to companies from countries 
without aggressive international anti-corruption enforcement regimes.3 In addi-
tion, in 2010, the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform published a paper 
arguing that the FCPA makes U.S.-regulated businesses less competitive than 
foreign competitors that are not subject to the law.4 Further, Jay Clayton, the 
current Chairman of the SEC, previously headed a New York City Bar Associa-
tion committee that, in 2011, wrote a paper highlighting the perceived disparity 
in the FCPA’s impact on U.S.-regulated companies in international business.5
Although several countries with large economies have more recently 
worked toward a multinational network of anti-corruption enforcement, increas-
ingly resulting in coordinated, multi-jurisdictional anti-corruption actions,6
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 831(c) (2012) (certain transactions involving nuclear materials); 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(h) (2012) (threatening a federal witness or informant); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (2012) 
(money laundering).
3. Squawk Box, Trump: Dimon’s Woes & Zuckerberg’s Prenuptial (CNBC Television 
Broadcast May 15, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2012/05/15/trump-dimons-woes-
zuckerbergs-prenuptial.html. In February 2017, now-President Trump reportedly complained to 
then-Secretary of State and former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson that the FCPA costs the United 
States millions of jobs and billions of dollars in lost sales overseas. See Dexter Filkins, Rex Tiller-
son at the Breaking Point, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2017/10/16/rex-tillerson-at-the-breaking-point.
4. Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Restor-
ing Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 6 (2010), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
5. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS-SHOULD ANYTHING BE DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.’S
UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? (Dec. 2011), https://www2.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf.
6. Recent multi-jurisdictional anti-corruption enforcement data show that non-U.S. enforc-
ers are increasingly exacting penalties against non-U.S. companies that eclipse those imposed by 
their U.S. counterparts for the same course of conduct.  In 2016 and 2017, more than $8 billion in 
cumulative corporate penalties resulted from multinational anti-corruption actions.  Of that amount, 
DOJ’s and the SEC’s portion of penalties constituted approximately $1.9 billion, or about 23% of 
penalties stemming from multinational anti-corruption actions. 2017 Year-End FCPA Update,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-
update/.
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there are still places in the world where corruption is the norm rather than the 
exception, and DOJ and the SEC continue to bring more enforcement actions 
for overseas bribery than their counterparts in every other country with similar 
anti-corruption laws.7 For these reasons, it is intuitive to think that the FCPA 
affects U.S. businesses disproportionality.
But the FCPA can be, and has been, enforced against non-U.S. companies 
and citizens for conduct outside of the United States.  Indeed, non-U.S. compa-
nies have been subject to many notable FCPA enforcement actions.  For in-
stance, the largest monetary resolution in FCPA history, involving over $850 
million, was reached with Russia-headquartered Mobile TeleSystems in March 
2019.8 In fact, eight of the ten largest monetary settlements in FCPA history 
involved companies based in France, Israel, Russia, Singapore, and the United 
Kingdom, among other foreign jurisdictions.9 Fifteen of the twenty-three per-
sons sentenced in FCPA cases in 2017 were non-U.S. citizens.10
This Article explores how U.S. authorities have enforced the FCPA against 
non-U.S. companies and tests the perception that the FCPA disproportionately 
impacts U.S. businesses.  After briefly discussing the FCPA, its enforcement, 
and its reach, this Article examines corporate FCPA enforcement activity since 
the statute’s enactment in 1977.  It finds that foreign firms have actually fared 
worse under the FCPA despite the fact that DOJ and the SEC have brought 
more enforcement actions against domestic companies in absolute terms.  The 
average cost of resolving an FCPA enforcement action to non-U.S. corporations 
of resolving an FCPA enforcement action has been more than four times higher
than it has been for domestic corporations: $72.3 million to $17.6 million.  In 
7. Forty-three nations have ratified or acceded to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (“OECD”) Convention of Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, which was signed on December 17, 1997, and requires 
signatories to enact and enforce anti-corruption standards akin to the FCPA.  See OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm.  According to Trace International’s
Global Enforcement Report 2016, from 1977 through 2016, the United States pursued nearly 70% 
of all enforcement actions relating to alleged bribery of foreign officials, with nearly seven times the 
number of the next highest country.  See TRACE INTERNATIONAL REPORT 7 (TRACE 2017),
Global Enforcement Report 2016 at 7, https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/
TRACEGlobalEnforcementReport2016_1.pdf.
8. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Mobile Telesystems Pjsc and Its Uzbek Sub-
sidiary Enter Into Resolutions of $850 Million with the Department Of Justice For Paying Bribes In 
Uzbekistan, (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mobile-telesystems-pjsc-and-its-uzbek-
subsidiary-enter-resolutions-850-million-department.
9. As of the date of publication, the top ten FCPA monetary resolutions with U.S. enforce-
ment authorities are as follows: (1) Mobile TeleSystems ($850 million); (2) Siemens AG ($800 mil-
lion); (3) Alstom S.A. ($772 million); (4) KBR/Halliburton ($579 million); (5) Teva ($519 million); 
(6) Telia ($483 million); (7) Och-Ziff ($412 million); (8) BAE Systems ($400 million); (9) Total 
S.A. ($398 million); and (10) VimpelCom ($398 million).  Of these, Mobile TeleSystems, Siemens, 
Alstom, Teva, Telia, BAE Systems, Total S.A., and VimpelCom are non-U.S. companies.
10. 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/.
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recent years, the difference has been even more pronounced—in 2017, the aver-
ages were $150.3 million and $16.1 million, respectively.  This Article also ex-
plores other ways in which FCPA enforcement has more dramatically affected 
foreign companies.  For instance, U.S. enforcement authorities have more fre-
quently required post-resolution obligations for foreign corporations.  Between 
2004 and 2018, nearly 60 percent of foreign companies involved in FCPA en-
forcement actions were subject to post-resolution obligations in the form of an 
independent compliance monitor, self-reporting, or a combination of the two, 
compared to only 54 percent of domestic companies.  Finally, this Article offers 
some theories to explain these data.
I. THE FCPA AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
Following reports of numerous U.S. businesses making millions of dollars 
of questionable payments to foreign government officials to secure business, 
President Carter signed the FCPA into law in December 1977.11 With limited 
exceptions, the FCPA makes it unlawful for certain entities and individuals to 
corruptly confer benefits on non-U.S. government officials to secure business.  
Specifically, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit:
the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce cor-
ruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving 
of anything of value to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . . . influencing any 
act or decision of the foreign official . . . securing any improper advantage; or . . .
inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or in-
strumentality thereof . . . in order to assist [the company] in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.12
The FCPA also has “accounting provisions” that apply to certain entities 
and individuals.13 The accounting provisions require these entities to (1) make 
and keep books, records, and accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions and disposition of assets and (2) devise 
and maintain reasonable internal accounting controls aimed at preventing and 
detecting unauthorized payments.14  The accounting provisions do not require 
that a false record or deficient control be linked to a bribe, so an inaccurately 
recorded payment or a deficiency of internal controls could lead to enforcement 
even if it does not violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.15
DOJ and the SEC have increasingly enforced the FCPA against corpora-
tions.  The first two decades of the statute’s existence passed with relatively few 
11. F. JOSEPH WARIN, MICHAEL S. DIAMANT, & ELIZABETH G. SILVER, THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 4 (2016).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
14. Id.
15. See id. 
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enforcement actions (in comparison to recent years), with DOJ and the SEC ini-
tiating an average of approximately three FCPA enforcement actions annually.16
As shown in FIGURE 1, a graph tracking the total number of FCPA corporate 
enforcement actions initiated by year, the late 2000s saw a surge in enforcement 
activity.  In 2004, DOJ and the SEC brought four combined corporate actions.  
The number doubled the next year and then shot up dramatically in 2007, when 
DOJ and the SEC initiated twenty-two combined FCPA actions against corpora-
tions.  Since then, annual enforcement levels have been consistently robust—
from 2011 through the end of 2018, DOJ and the SEC averaged more than nine-
teen combined FCPA enforcement actions per year against corporations—with 
a peak of thirty-seven in 2016.
FIGURE 1, COMBINED DOJ/SEC FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS PER YEAR 
AGAINST CORPORATE DEFENDANTS, 1978–2018.17
FCPA violations can attract severe penalties.  For criminal violations of the 
anti-bribery provisions, corporations can be fined up to $2 million for each 
criminal count or twice the pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the bribe, 
which can be significantly greater and entail costly collateral consequences, 
such as potential U.S. government suspension and debarment.18 Individuals 
who violate the anti-bribery provisions can be imprisoned up to five years and 
fined $250,000 per violation.19
16. See Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1447, 1449 (2008).
17. 2018 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER (Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-year-end-fcpa-update/.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1987).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). 
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Violations of the accounting provisions can result in corporate fines of up to 
$25 million per violation, while individuals face up to a $5 million fine and 
twenty years in prison.20 In addition to penalties, civil violations often require 
ill-gotten profits to be disgorged,21 which can involve multiple millions of dol-
lars.22
As FCPA enforcement levels have increased, so too have their price tags.  
In 2004, the largest corporate monetary resolution in the history of FCPA en-
forcement was $24.8 million, which Lockheed paid a decade earlier in 1995.23
Since 2004, the average cost of a corporate FCPA enforcement action exceeded 
$20 million in all but three years.  Twenty-two corporate resolutions with DOJ 
and the SEC have eclipsed $100 million, and the Lockheed resolution today 
does not even make the top 60.
Whether initiated because of a concern raised through internal reporting 
channels or by an enforcer, an FCPA enforcement action typically comes at the 
end of a long internal investigation involving attorneys, auditors, efforts to lo-
cate, preserve, and produce documents requested by the government, significant 
management and personnel time and focus, and even the loss of employees who 
are disciplined for misconduct.  When FCPA issues are resolved and gain pub-
licity, collateral consequences can follow, including civil lawsuits, foreign ac-
tions, suspension or debarment from government contracting, and more time 
and money to remediate the issues and improve corporate compliance and inter-
nal controls.
DOJ and the SEC also often require companies to retain, at their own cost, 
compliance monitors as a condition of an FCPA resolution.  The prospect of an 
FCPA monitorship, which usually lasts between eighteen and thirty-six months, 
and its associated cost, effort, and scrutiny is highly unpleasant for a company 
that just emerged from a long, expensive, and invasive investigation and simply 
wants to get back to business.24 The monitor is an independent party usually 
tasked with ensuring that an offending company complies with the terms of the 
resolution and implements anti-corruption policies, procedures, and controls 
reasonably designed to detect and prevent FCPA violations.  The monitor eval-
uates the company’s anti-corruption compliance program, determines if it is 
reasonably designed and implemented, makes recommendations for improve-
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
21. See §§ 78u(d), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e).
22. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for En-
gaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
23. 2014 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2014-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx.
24. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Christopher W.H. Sullivan, Corporate 
Monitors and the Monitorship Process in FROM BAKSHEESH TO BRIBERY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND GRAFT (T. Markus Funk & Andrew S. Boutros eds., 
Apr. 2019); F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: 
FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011) (for discus-
sion on how DOJ and the SEC utilize monitors as part of FCPA resolutions).
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ment, and sets forth his or her observations in periodic written reports to the 
company and U.S. government.  To do so, the monitor interviews employees, 
reviews documents, makes site visits to domestic and international locations, 
and conducts various analyses and testing—all of which will be called for in the 
company’s settlement papers.  Because FCPA cases can reveal systemic cultural 
and internal controls problems at a company, DOJ and the SEC often impose a 
monitor as one of the terms of an FCPA resolution.  In fact, since 2004, nearly 
thirty percent of companies resolving FCPA actions with DOJ and the SEC had 
to retain a monitor.25
II. THE FCPA’S JURISDICTIONAL REACH
When considering how DOJ and the SEC enforce the FCPA against U.S. 
and non-U.S. corporations, it is helpful to understand the ways the anti-bribery 
and accounting provisions can reach those companies.
A. Entities and Persons Covered By The Anti-Bribery Provisions
The anti-bribery provisions apply to “covered entities,” which include (1) 
“issuers”—companies that have a class of securities registered under § 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) or are required to file peri-
odic reports with the SEC under § 15(d) of the Exchange Act;26 (2) “domestic 
concerns”—U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents, as well as any business entity 
that has its principal place of business in the United States or is organized under 
U.S. laws;27 and (3) any other person who acts in furtherance of a corrupt pay-
ment while within U.S. territory.28  The provisions also sweep in any officer, 
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on behalf of a covered person 
or entity.29 In the sections below, we detail how these mechanisms can be ap-
plied to reach a wide array of foreign entities.
1.  Foreign Issuers
Under the first anti-bribery provision, the term “issuer” encompasses for-
eign companies with Level II or Level III American Depository Receipts 
(“ADRs”) on a U.S. exchange.30 A foreign company that qualifies as an issuer 
is therefore subject to the first anti-bribery provision even if the relevant mis-
25. From 2004 to the end of 2018, 187 companies reached FCPA resolutions with DOJ 
and/or the SEC.  Of these companies, 534, or 28.3%, had to retain a compliance monitor.  
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), (g); 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a); 15 U.S.C. 78dd-3(a).  
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o(d); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE 
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2012) (“RESOURCE GUIDE”).
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conduct occurred outside the United States.31 For example, Siemens AG settled 
FCPA charges for $800 million, of which $350 million went to the SEC as dis-
gorgement and $450 million to DOJ in fines, stemming in part from alleged 
bribes paid to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, 
and the Americas.32  U.S. enforcement authorities relied on Siemens’s shares 
being listed on the New York Stock Exchange.33 Likewise, DOJ charged the 
Norwegian company Statoil ASA for allegedly bribing an Iranian official, 
pointing to the fact that the company’s ADRs were listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange as the basis for FCPA jurisdiction.34
Unlike an issuer organized under the laws of the United States, however, a 
foreign issuer is subject to the first anti-bribery provision only if it makes “use 
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” in further-
ance of an illicit payment.35 Nonetheless, DOJ and the SEC have broadly inter-
preted “interstate commerce” to encompass not only “trade, commerce, trans-
portation, or communication among the several States,” but also that “between 
any foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or ship
outside thereof.”36 Additionally, the term includes the “intrastate use of . . . any 
interstate means of communication” or “any other interstate instrumentality.”37
Relying on this, the government has asserted that the following acts involve the 
use of interstate commerce: (1) traveling across state borders or internationally 
to or from the United States;38 (2) placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, 
text message, or fax from, to, or through the United States;39 and (3) sending a 
31. Id.
32. Press Release, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
294.htm.
33. See Criminal Information at 3, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-
00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/2000/000855.pdf; Com-
plaint at 4, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167 (Dec. 12, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf; Siemens AG and Three Subsidiar-
ies Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.  Though trading on the New York Stock Ex-
change was the basis upon which U.S. authorities brought FCPA charges against Siemens, the com-
pany has since delisted its shares on that exchange and no longer has any reporting obligations to 
the SEC.  See Delisting New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Siemens AG, 
https://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/delisting_faq_en.pdf.
34. See Criminal Information at 2, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr-960 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/1000/000490.pdf.
35. § 78dd-1(a).  In contrast, a U.S. issuer is subject to the anti-bribery provisions even if the 
company did not use the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce. § 78dd-
1(g)(1).
36. RESOURCE GUIDE, at 11; see also §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f )(5).
37. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f )(5) (emphasis added). 
38. RESOURCE GUIDE, at 11.
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that “the use 
of the Internet is an ‘instrumentality of interstate commerce’ ”) (citing United States v. MacEwan, 
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wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking sys-
tem.40
2.  Territorial Jurisdiction
The third anti-bribery provision makes it unlawful for any other person, 
while in U.S. territory, to use means of interstate commerce (such as wire trans-
fers or e-mail), or do any other act, in furtherance of a corrupt offer or pay-
ment.41 Through § 78dd-3, the FCPA’s anti-bribery prohibition can reach for-
eign entities that operate outside of the United States if they make use of “the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or engage in any 
“act in furtherance of” a corrupt offer or payment “while in the territory of the 
United States.”42 Thus, a foreign non-issuer company can be subject to the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions even if it does not use an instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce.43
Based on FCPA settlements, committing an “act in furtherance” of a corrupt 
payment requires minimal effort.  For example, the government has asserted 
that the jurisdictional threshold was met through e-mails from Taiwan to Cali-
fornia listing a line item for “promotional and advertising expenses,” which 
were approved in the United States, based on funds allocated for improper pay-
ments.44 Similarly, the FCPA’s legislative history indicates that the phrase 
“while in the territory of the United States” should encompass “all areas over 
which the United States asserts territorial jurisdiction.”45 As such, Congress 
intended the phrase to be “interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical 
connection to the bribery act is not required.”46 Following Congress’s lead, 
DOJ and the SEC have maintained that a foreign non-issuer commits an act 
445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006)); SEC v. Solucorp. Indus. Ltd., 274 F. Supp. 2d 379, 419 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)); Criminal Information at 5, United States v. Teva LLC., No. 12-cr-20967 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/920236/download (alleging that 
employees and agents of Teva Russia “sent emails through the United States”).
40. See, e.g., Criminal Information at 8, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr-960 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/1000/000490.pdf (noting that Statoil 
wire-transferred money to an Iranian official through a U.S. bank in New York City).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
42. Id. 
43. RESOURCE GUIDE, at 11–12. 
44. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, & Elizabeth G. Silver, THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 8 (2016) (citing Criminal Information 
at 6, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 1:02-cr-0124 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2002), 
http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/001572.pdf); see also Criminal Information at 15, 
United States v. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO, No. 1:10-cr-00064 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 
2010) (alleging territorial jurisdiction on the basis of wire transfers from Daimler accounts in Ger-
many to financial institutions in the United States).
45. S. REP. NO. 105-277 at 6 (1998).
46. Id. (quoting ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., COMMENTARIES ON 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS ¶ 24 (1997)).
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while in U.S. territory if it “causes an act to be done” in the United States by an 
agent,47 even if the company itself is not physically present and took no relevant 
action in U.S. territory.
This interpretation has led to a theory of liability based on correspondent 
bank activity.  Because foreign banks often do not have a branch in the United 
States, they rely frequently upon U.S. correspondent accounts to facilitate trans-
actions in U.S. dollars.48  The government seems to have taken the view that 
wire transfers through U.S. correspondent accounts by a foreign actor could sat-
isfy the third anti-bribery provision’s territorial requirements. For example, in a 
$218.8 million FCPA enforcement action against JGC Corp., a Japanese engi-
neering and construction firm, DOJ premised FCPA liability on conspiracy and 
aiding-and-abetting charges.49 While the government seemed to assert that 
those charges were sufficient to confer FCPA jurisdiction, DOJ also suggested 
that JGC’s wire transfers through a correspondent bank account established a 
standalone territorial nexus.50
Nevertheless, U.S. courts have thus far shown reluctance to accept such a 
broad understanding of territorial jurisdiction.  In United States v. Goncalves,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a foreign defend-
ant’s oral motion for acquittal where DOJ asserted jurisdiction based on him 
having mailed a purchase agreement from the United Kingdom to Washington, 
D.C., in furtherance of a corrupt scheme.51  Though the court did not issue a 
written opinion, the judge indicated from the bench that anti-bribery jurisdiction 
requires the defendant to have committed the violative act while physically 
within U.S. territory.52
3.  Agent of an Issuer, Domestic Concern, or 
Entity Acting within U.S. Territory
Under the anti-bribery provisions, any foreign officer, director, employee, 
agent, or stockholder acting on behalf of an issuer or domestic concern53 may be 
47. RESOURCE GUIDE, at 11 n.55. 
48. See Natasha N. Wilson, Note, Pushing the Limits of Jurisdiction over Foreign Actors 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2014).
49. Criminal Information at 13, 19. See United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 6, 2011), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/2000/001314.pdf.
50. Id.
51. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 1, United States v. Goncalves, 1:09-cr-00335-RJL 
(D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/goncalvesa/2012-02-24-
goncalvesa-courts-dismissal-order.pdf.
52. See Hearing Transcript at 10, United States v. Goncalves (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2011) (ap-
proving of the “more cautious, conservative interpretation” whereby “each act has to be while in the 
territory of the United States”).
53. A domestic concern refers to (1) “any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of 
the United States;” or (2) “any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business 
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in 
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found liable for violating the FCPA if such person made use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of an improper 
payment.54 The same is true of a person who acts on behalf of a foreign non-
issuer entity while in the territory of the United States if such person made use 
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or takes any 
other action in furtherance of an improper payment.55 This was the theory DOJ 
posited when bringing FCPA conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting charges 
against Marubeni Corporation, which maintains its headquarters in Tokyo and 
was not alleged to have committed any relevant misconduct within U.S. territo-
ry.56  According to DOJ, TSKJ, a four-company venture consisting of a “do-
mestic concern” and a U.S.-issuer, retained Marubeni Corporation to bribe Ni-
gerian government officials in exchange for contracts to design and build a 
liquefied natural gas plant.57 DOJ’s Information premised FCPA jurisdiction 
over Marubeni Corporation on its status as an “agent” of a domestic concern 
and U.S.-issuer.58
The SEC has gone even further by charging a foreign subsidiary as the 
agent of its parent company.  In a $125 million FCPA resolution with Amster-
dam-based Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., the SEC maintained that Snampro-
getti served as an agent of ENI, an Italian company and U.S. issuer, without al-
leging any specific facts to prove an agency relationship.  Rather, the SEC 
simply noted that Snamprogetti was a “wholly-owned subsidiary” over which 
ENI “exercised control and supervision.”59
Nonetheless, at least one U.S. district court has reasoned that the anti-
bribery provision does not extend to a foreign subsidiary acting as an agent “of 
an issuer or domestic concern.”60 After examining the FCPA’s legislative histo-
ry, the court concluded that an “agent” refers solely to “foreign nationals or res-
idents,” not foreign subsidiaries.61
4.  Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
Just as a subsidiary can be liable for violating the FCPA on behalf of a cov-
ered entity, U.S. authorities, and more especially the SEC, have asserted that a 
the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, 
possession, or commonwealth of the United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2012).  
54. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a)  
55. § 78dd-3(a).  
56. See Criminal Information at 2, 5, United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 4:12-cr-00022 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/
2012/01/24/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf.
57. Id. at 2. 
58. Id. at 5–6. 
59. See Complaint at 3–4, SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. et al, No. 4:10-cv-2414 (S.D. Tex. July 7 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-119.pdf.
60. Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C. 1992).
61. Id.
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parent company can be accountable for the actions of its subsidiary in two cir-
cumstances: First, a parent company that participates sufficiently in a given ac-
tivity—by, for example, “direct[ing] its subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise 
directly participat[ing] in the bribe scheme”—may be directly liable for such 
conduct.62 Second, according to traditional principles of agency law, a parent 
company may be directly liable for the actions of its subsidiary based on the 
“fundamental characteristic” of control.63 If a parent company enjoys a certain 
measure of “knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both generally 
and in the context of the specific transaction,” then the government will consid-
er the subsidiary to be the agent of the parent.64 As such, the subsidiary’s con-
duct and knowledge are “imputed to its parent.”65 DOJ has likened these con-
cepts to “traditional principles of respondeat superior,” where the parent may 
be liable for the acts of its subsidiary “undertaken within the scope of [its] em-
ployment and intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.”66
5.  Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy
Foreign non-issuers can only be held liable under the anti-bribery provisions 
if they are agents, employees, officers, directors, or shareholders of a U.S. issu-
er or domestic concern or take an act in furtherance of a corrupt scheme, includ-
ing the payment of a bribe, while in the territory of the United States.  DOJ has 
nevertheless asserted that foreign non-issuers can be held liable for conspiring 
to violate the FCPA or aiding and abetting an FCPA violation even if the for-
eign non-issuer could not be independently charged with a substantive FCPA 
violation.  For example, in the eyes of DOJ, if the foreign non-issuer aids and 
abets an issuer, domestic concern, or entity that has acted within U.S. territory, 
substantive jurisdiction is established.67  Applying this theory, DOJ reached a 
$218.8 million FCPA resolution with JGC Corporation for aiding and abetting 
Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., a domestic concern, even though JGC engaged in 
no relevant action within U.S. territory.68
A recent decision by the Second Circuit, however, should temper any view 
that foreign non-issuers (who are also not agents, employees, officers, directors, 
or shareholders of a U.S. issuer or domestic concern) can be liable for FCPA 
conspiracy or aiding and abetting charges arising from conduct that took place 





67. See RESOURCE GUIDE, at 34 (discussing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 
(1946)).
68. Criminal Information at 18, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 6, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/04/27/04-6-
11jgc-corp-info.pdf; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgc-corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-
practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-2188.
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entirely outside of U.S. soil.  In United States v. Hoskins, the Second Circuit 
held that a nonresident foreign national may not be charged with conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA unless he is himself an agent of an issuer or domestic concern 
or committed an act while physically present within U.S. territory.69 In a de-
tailed analysis of the FCPA’s legislative history, the Second Circuit found that 
Congress evinced an “affirmative policy” to exclude foreign nationals who op-
erate outside U.S. territory when they do not act as agents, employees, directors, 
officers, or shareholders of a U.S. issuer or domestic concern.70 In enumerating 
the particular individuals who may be held liable under the FCPA, the Second 
Circuit reasoned that Congress manifested an intention to avoid creating 
standalone FCPA liability for unspecified defendants through use of conspiracy 
and complicity statutes.71 Further, irrespective of Congress’s intention to limit 
criminal FCPA liability to particular categories of defendants, the Second Cir-
cuit found that there was no “clearly expressed congressional intent” to rebut a 
presumption against using conspiracy liability to broaden the extraterritorial 
reach of a statute.72
B. Entities and Persons Covered By The Accounting Provisions
The accounting provisions further expand the reach of the FCPA.  Although 
the accounting provisions do not themselves apply directly to foreign non-issuer 
subsidiaries, a foreign company may be liable for violating the accounting pro-
visions either as an issuer or as a non-issuer entity.
1.  Foreign Issuer
The accounting provisions apply to any issuer, including foreign companies.  
Although a foreign issuer is strictly liable for civil violations of the accounting 
provisions,73 it must have acted “knowingly” to be subject to criminal liabil-
ity.74 In both scenarios, however, an issuer is responsible for its subsidiaries’ 
compliance.75 Failures at the subsidiary level may incur liability for the parent 
company.76
69. See United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2018). 
70. Id. at 93.  
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 93. 
73. See SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a violation of the 
accounting provisions “need not be knowing in order to lead to civil liability”).
74. Securities Regulation Act 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(5) (2012). A natural person, however, 
is subject to criminal liability only if he acted “willfully.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012).
75. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 39.
76. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, 11, SEC v. Vimpelcom LTD, No. 1:16-cv-01266 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 2016), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/4000/003207.pdf (bringing an enforce-
ment action against the defendant for its wholly owned subsidiary’s violations of the accounting 
provisions); Complaint at 5, In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 1:01-cv-02079 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 
2001), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/4000/002568.pdf (same).
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If a parent company owns 50% or less of a subsidiary, the statute requires a 
“good faith” effort to ensure that the subsidiary implements a system of internal 
accounting controls as specified in the FCPA.77 In evaluating whether a com-
pany made a good faith effort, courts consider “the relative degree of the issu-
er’s ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices gov-
erning the business operations of the country in which such firm is located.”78
The SEC has relied on the notion of “operational control” to assert liability in 
cases of minority ownership.79
2.  Foreign Non-Issuer
A foreign non-issuer may also be directly liable for causing an issuer’s vio-
lations of the accounting provisions.  This situation could occur in the following 
four circumstances: First, a foreign non-issuer could “cause to be falsified, any 
book, record or account subject to [the books and records provision].”80 Proof 
that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully is unnecessary for civil liability 
under the books and records provision.  Rather, the government must merely 
show that a defendant acted unreasonably in failing to keep and maintain de-
tailed and accurate records.81 Second, a foreign non-issuer could incur civil or 
criminal liability for “knowingly circumvent[ing] or knowingly fail[ing] to im-
plement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify[ing] any 
book, record, or account.”82  Here, to impose even civil liability, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that a defendant acted knowingly.83 Third, a foreign 
non-issuer could face civil or criminal liability for aiding and abetting an issu-
er’s violation of the accounting provisions.84 Fourth, a foreign non-issuer that 
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2004). 
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, 8, SEC v. Bellsouth Corp., (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2002) (No. 1:02-
cv-0113), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/4000/002817.pdf (finding BellSouth Corpora-
tion civilly liable for its subsidiary’s violations because its “operational control” gave it “the ability”
to ensure compliance).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2019).
81. See SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 865–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); WARIN, supra 
note 11, at 22.
82. 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(5) (2012).
83. See SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (noting 
that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant knowingly violated the 
internal controls provision).
84. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 43, 45.  See also Complaint at 14, SEC v. Hallibur-
ton Co., No. 4:09-cv-399 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (charging subsidiary KBR, Inc., for aiding and 
abetting violations of the accounting provisions by “knowingly or recklessly” offering substantial 
assistance to its parent Halliburton Co.); Complaint at 3, SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 4:10-cv-4334 
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) (“Panalpina, Inc. also aided and abetted its issuer customers’ violations of 
Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act . . . .”). 
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conspires with an issuer to violate the accounting provisions may incur criminal 
liability.85
C. Personal Jurisdiction
Beyond the foregoing jurisdictional requirements of the FCPA, a basic con-
stitutional threshold—whether the defendant had “minimum contacts” with the 
United States and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasona-
ble86—must be met before a foreign individual or entity can be brought before a 
U.S. court on FCPA charges.  Few courts have ruled on what minimum contacts 
are required in the FCPA context; however, precedent suggests that personal 
jurisdiction is not a significant barrier to the FCPA’s application over foreign 
individuals or entities.
In 2013, two district court judges, both from the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, reached divergent conclusions concerning what 
constitutes sufficient “minimum contacts” to confer personal jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants charged with civil violations of the FCPA’s accounting pro-
visions.
In Straub, the SEC alleged that the defendants, who were Hungarian citi-
zens and residents, participated in two schemes to bribe public officials in Mac-
edonia and Montenegro.87 First, in 2005 and 2006, the defendants allegedly 
bribed Macedonian officials through intermediaries to block a competitor from 
entering the market; and second, in 2005, the defendants allegedly used consult-
ants to bribe Montenegrin officials to facilitate an acquisition.88 The three ex-
ecutives then allegedly caused the bribes to be falsely recorded in Magyar Tele-
kom’s books and records, which were consolidated into the books and records 
of its parent company, Deutsche Telekom AG.89  Both entities were publicly 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.90 Though none of the executives had 
ever set foot in the United States in relation to the alleged bribery scheme, the 
Straub court found sufficient minimum contacts with the United States because 
Magyar was an issuer and the executives allegedly falsified Magyar’s books and 
records while knowing that prospective U.S. investors likely would be influ-
enced by the resulting false financial statements that would be filed with the 
SEC.91
85. Id. at 45.  See also Criminal Information at 6, United States v. SSI International Far East, 
LTD., No. 06-CR-398 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 2006), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/
1000/000476.pdf (asserting jurisdiction over SSI International, a foreign non-issuer, for conspiring 
to violate the accounting provisions).
86. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
87. SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
88. Id. at 249. 
89. Id. at 250.
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 255–56. 
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Less than two weeks after the Straub decision, however, another judge in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a separate FCPA 
case arising from the SEC and DOJ investigation of German manufacturer (and 
issuer) Siemens AG.92 In SEC v. Sharef, the SEC alleged that the defendant, 
Herbert Steffen, a German citizen, pressured another Siemens executive to au-
thorize bribes and participated in at least one phone call in furtherance of a $100 
million bribery scheme in Argentina with a co-defendant who was then located 
in the United States.93 The court ruled that Steffen lacked sufficient minimum 
contacts with the United States to confer personal jurisdiction.94  The court’s 
decision relied on the following circumstances: first, the executive whom Stef-
fen pressured to make certain bribes did not agree to do so until he communi-
cated with several “higher ups” whose responses he perceived to be instructions 
to make the bribes.  Steffen did not actually authorize the bribes.95 Second, 
Steffen was not alleged to have directed, ordered, or even been aware of efforts 
to cover up the payments.  Nor was he alleged to have played any role in the 
falsification of Siemens’ financial statements.96
Whereas the Straub decision focused on the bribery scheme’s connection to 
the United States, Sharef focused predominantly on Steffen’s personal conduct 
and ties to the United States.  This may explain why Sharef found insufficient 
minimum contacts notwithstanding the fact that the bribery scheme described in 
Sharef appeared to have more significant ties to the United States than the brib-
ery scheme at issue in Straub.  For example, Steffen’s co-defendants held nu-
merous meetings in the United States and paid bribes to Argentine officials via 
bank accounts in New York and Miami.97
III. METHODOLOGY
We should explain how this Article classifies “foreign” (or non-U.S.) and 
“domestic” (or U.S.) entities.  That distinction can be complex where multina-
tional corporations are involved.  For purposes of this Article, we examined a 
number of factors, with no single factor being dispositive, to determine whether 
to classify a company as “U.S.” or “non-U.S.”  These included the location of 
the company’s headquarters, the country of its legal incorporation, its center of 
operations and predominant location of its workforce, where it originated, and 
the dominant country from which its revenue is derived.  For example, we count 
Weatherford International as a domestic company, even though Weatherford is 
a multinational corporation incorporated and headquartered in Switzerland, be-
92. See generally SEC v. Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d 539, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
93. Id. at 542–43.
94. Id. at 549.  
95. Id. at 546. 
96. Id. at 547.  
97. Id. at 543. 
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cause it was founded in Texas, a plurality of its employees are based in the 
United States,98 its corporate offices are in Houston,99 and nearly half of its rev-
enue was generated in North America in 2014 and 2015.100
To measure the monetary impact of FCPA enforcement, this  considers the 
amount owed through penalties, fines, or disgorgement to DOJ and the SEC—
even though the FCPA’s indirect impacts can be felt far beyond the immediate 
price tag of an FCPA resolution.  Monetary resolutions for purposes of this Ar-
ticle do not include amounts owed to foreign governments or agencies, even if 
contemplated in a company’s settlement with the U.S. government.  In addition, 
settlements that involved both a parent and subsidiary are calculated together, 
with the combined settlement amount being attributed to the parent company.  
For example, in September 2017, Swedish telephone firm Telia Company AB 
reached a $508.6 million resolution with DOJ, $40.5 million of which was on 
behalf of Telia’s subsidiary, Coscom LLC.101  This amount, however, can be 
offset by as much as $274 million for any criminal penalties paid to Dutch au-
thorities.102 Separately, the SEC entered into a cease-and-desist order based on 
the same underlying conduct requiring Telia to disgorge $457 million.103 But 
approximately half of that amount, $208.5 million, was credited because it was 
earmarked as payment to Swedish authorities in connection with the same un-
derlying conduct.104 Consequently, after deducting offsets for amounts set aside 
for foreign authorities, Telia’s monetary resolution for FCPA violations is 
counted as approximately $483 million for purposes of this Article.
IV. THE FCPA’S MONETARY IMPACT ON 
U.S. VERSUS NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS
U.S. corporations have been the subject of FCPA enforcement actions more 
often than their foreign counterparts.  Of the 306 corporate DOJ and SEC FCPA 
enforcement actions initiated from 1978 through 2018, 198 (or nearly two-
thirds) involved a domestic entity, though in recent years the difference has 
been shrinking significantly.  As shown in FIGURE 2, in many years enforce-
ment actions initiated against foreign corporations have nearly kept pace with 
98. WEATHERFORD INT’L PLC 2016 10K (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.weatherfordannualreport.com/media/downloads/2016-weatherford-annual-report.pdf.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 91–92.
101. Letter from DOJ to Counsel for Telia, (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/press-release/file/997851/download, at 7.
102. Id. at 8–9.
103. Telia Company AB, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Section 
21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions 
and a Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 81669, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Rel. No. 3898, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18195 (Sept. 21, 2017).
104. Id.
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those against domestic corporations, even exceeding them in 2010, 2017, and 
2018, and equaling them in 2004.
FIGURE 2, COMBINED DOJ/SEC FCPA CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
PER YEAR, 2004–2018.
This may be the case for a number of reasons.  First, prosecuting a U.S. 
corporation may generally consume less time and fewer resources than a non-
U.S. corporation, whose critical documents and employees are frequently locat-
ed overseas and, in many instances, require coordination with foreign authori-
ties to obtain.
Second, despite the FCPA’s broad reach, its jurisdictional hurdles have his-
torically precluded enforcement against foreign entities.  Before a 1998 
amendment to the FCPA, among foreign entities, only foreign issuers were sub-
ject to FCPA liability and even then, only the FCPA’s accounting and internal 
controls provisions applied.  Indeed, for a long period in FCPA history, foreign 
companies had good reason to believe their exposure to FCPA liability was lim-
ited and, consequently, had less incentive to expend considerable resources en-
hancing their anti-corruption compliance programs.
In response to the call of the OECD Convention that each signatory “take 
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery
of a foreign public official when the offense is committed in whole or in part in 
its territory,” the 1998 amendments extended the FCPA’s application in two 
significant respects: first, the anti-bribery provision was expanded to encompass 
foreign entities that further a corrupt payment while in the United States 
through the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  Second, the amended 
FCPA covers anti-bribery violations that occur entirely outside the United 
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States, provided the defendant is an issuer, an agent of an issuer, a domestic 
concern, or an agent of a domestic concern.105
Even after the 1998 amendment, the jurisdictional thresholds of the FCPA 
can preclude prosecution of certain foreign entities.  As an example, foreign 
bribe recipients cannot be prosecuted under the FCPA, which instead targets the 
supply side of bribery.  In United States  v. Castle, the government tested 
whether it could charge foreign officials for conspiring to violate the FCPA by 
receiving a bribe.106 The Fifth Circuit held that Congress intentionally omitted 
the recipients of bribes from the FCPA, instead focusing on those who pay 
bribes.107 This holding is less significant now because in recent years DOJ has 
routinely charged foreign official recipients of bribe payments under the money 
laundering statute where they use the U.S. financial system to launder the pro-
ceeds.108
The FCPA has been enforced against U.S. companies more frequently, but 
there is no question that foreign corporations have disproportionately borne the 
lion’s share of FCPA fines and penalties.  Foreign companies are 35% of all 
FCPA corporate resolutions but account for more than 69% ($7.8 billion) of all 
FCPA monetary settlement amounts since that statute was enacted.  Foreign 
companies’ average monetary settlement amounts have exceeded those of do-
mestic corporations by $54,699,843, or 312%.  From 1978 through 2018, the 
average FCPA monetary resolution in an action against a domestic corporation 
was $17,559,982, compared with $72,259,825 for foreign corporations. And 
while FCPA enforcement actions against foreign corporations were uncommon 
until approximately 2004, the same trend holds true when focusing only on 
2004 through 2018.  During those years, the average FCPA monetary resolution 
against U.S. companies was $21,182,931, compared with $75,016,934 for non-
U.S. companies.  In other words, in FCPA enforcement actions from 2004 
through 2018, non-U.S. companies have been subject to monetary penalties that 
on average are nearly four times greater than those imposed on U.S. companies.  
In absolute terms, monetary resolutions from 2004 through 2018 against foreign 
companies have totaled $7.8 billion compared with $3.4 billion against domes-
tic corporations.
As shown in FIGURES 3 and 4, foreign companies have faced stratospheric 
monetary penalties compared with domestic companies in recent years.  The 
contrast was particularly acute in 2017, when foreign corporations paid an aver-
age of $150,349,415 (or $1.05 billion in total) compared with an average of 
$16,103,333 (or $96.6 million in total) for domestic corporations.
105. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-1 to 
77dd-3 (2019) (as amended in 1998 by Pub. L. No. 105-366).
106. 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 834.  
108. 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update; 2018 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON, 
DUNN  & CRUTCHER (Jul. 9, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-mid-year-fcpa-update/.
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FIGURE 3, TOTAL AMOUNTS OF MONETARY RESOLUTIONS, 2013–2018.
FIGURE 4, AVERAGE AMOUNTS OF MONETARY RESOLUTIONS, 2013–2018.
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IV. THE FCPA’S INDIRECT IMPACTS ON U.S. VERSUS NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS
Monetary penalties are not the only component of an FCPA resolution that 
impact a company’s bottom line.  Post-resolution obligations, including moni-
torships, self-reporting, or some combination of the two, often accompany 
FCPA settlements.  In many instances, the cost and collateral consequences of 
these post-resolution obligations rival or even eclipse the impact of the mone-
tary settlement itself.  This is particularly true of corporate compliance moni-
tors, whose duties can last anywhere from a few months to several years.  The 
monitor requires both financial and human resources of the company, while 
bringing with it the possibility of unearthing new corruption problems unrelated 
to those giving rise to the settlement.  Such revelations, in turn, can trigger re-
porting requirements, paving the way for a second round of costly FCPA resolu-
tions.
Since the FCPA’s inception, monitorships have been imposed on non-U.S. 
companies more frequently than U.S. ones.  Approximately 21% of U.S. com-
panies have been required to retain an independent monitor as a condition of 
settlement, compared with nearly 30% for foreign corporations.  Compared to 
those imposed on U.S. corporations, the government has imposed lengthier re-
porting periods on foreign companies, whose monitorships last an average of 
nearly 31 months, or more than two-and-a-half years.
Another way that the FCPA indirectly impacts foreign companies more 
heavily than domestic ones is through tag-along foreign enforcement actions.  
Increasingly, FCPA resolutions involve successive prosecutions by foreign en-
forcers arising from the same core set of allegations, thereby requiring the com-
pany to expend additional time and resources addressing FCPA allegations not 
only with U.S. enforcers but also with foreign authorities.  Even if a corporation 
brokers a resolution with the U.S. government, such agreements cannot pre-
clude the possibility that foreign jurisdictions will bring an enforcement action 
based on the same facts.  For example, Halliburton and its affiliates reached a 
$579 million resolution (the third largest in FCPA history) with DOJ and the 
SEC in 2009 for the alleged payment of bribes to Nigerian officials.109  Less 
than two years later, Halliburton reached a resolution with the Nigerian gov-
ernment based on the same conduct.110 In a follow-on settlement with Nigeria, 
Halliburton agreed to pay $32.5 million, as well as $2.5 million for attorneys’ 
fees and other expenses to Nigeria.111 DOJ and the SEC can also bring FCPA 
follow-on enforcement actions stemming from an investigation of a foreign au-
thority.  A notable example is Siemens, whose resolution with the SEC and DOJ 
109. Press Release, Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton 
for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
110. Halliburton Confirms Agreement to Settle with Federal Government of Nigeria,
BUSSINESS WIRE, Dec. 21, 2010 https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101221005624/en/
Halliburton-Confirms-Agreement-Settle-Federal-Government-Nigeria.
111. Id. 
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followed raids initiated by the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office in Germa-
ny.112
In absolute terms, as shown in FIGURE 5, more foreign companies have en-
tered FCPA resolutions with U.S. authorities that also involve an investigation 
or settlement with an overseas foreign enforcer, notwithstanding that far more 
U.S. companies have been subject to FCPA enforcement actions than non-U.S. 
ones.  Indeed, more than 45% of all non-U.S. corporations that have reached 
FCPA resolutions have done so with the involvement of a foreign enforcer in 
some form.  Of those, approximately half have also reached a settlement with an 
overseas enforcer for largely the same conduct that was resolved with the U.S. 
authorities.  By contrast, only about 12% of U.S. companies that have entered 
DOJ and SEC FCPA resolutions have done so where a foreign enforcer was in-
volved in some capacity.
The trend of coordinated, multi-jurisdictional anti-corruption actions involv-
ing DOJ and/or the SEC and any one (or more) of a growing number of their 
foreign counterparts has only accelerated in recent years.113 Major corporate 
FCPA resolutions now routinely involve the SEC and DOJ participating in 
cross-border resolutions by, among other things, crediting a company’s pay-
ments to foreign enforcement authorities in calculating the U.S. criminal fine.114
112. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal 
Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
113. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 108.
114. See 2018 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 108. In May 2018, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Rod J. Rosenstein introduced a new DOJ “Policy on Coordination of Corporate Resolution 
Penalties,” which requires, among other things, that DOJ should coordinate with and consider fines, 
penalties, and/or forfeiture paid to enforcement authorities investigating the same company for the 
same conduct.  Id.
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FIGURE 5, CORPORATIONS RESOLVING DOJ/SEC FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
WHERE FOREIGN ENFORCERS ARE INVOLVED, 1978–2018.
V. THEORIES BEHIND THE TRENDS
It is not obvious that there is one apparent reason, but a number of theories 
could, in combination, explain the seemingly disparate treatment of non-U.S. 
and U.S. entities at the hands of U.S. enforcement authorities. As a preliminary 
matter, U.S. companies have had more time to enhance their anti-corruption 
compliance programs, revisit their business practices, and improve the way they 
handle investigations in an era of vigorous FCPA enforcement.  As shown in 
FIGURE 6, by 1996, when an FCPA resolution was reached for the first time 
with a non-U.S. corporation, 25 U.S. companies had already resolved FCPA al-
legations.  Also by this time, 15 U.S. executives had pleaded guilty to, or oth-
erwise resolved, FCPA charges, compared with only 5 foreign executives.  By 
the end of 2004, when FCPA resolutions with non-U.S. companies begin to ap-
pear with increasing regularity, thirty-eight U.S. companies and 39 executives 
of U.S. companies had already reached FCPA resolutions, compared with only 
3 foreign corporations and 13 foreign executives.  In addition, DOJ must by 
statute provide a written opinion at the request of an issuer or domestic concern 
indicating whether DOJ would take enforcement action against the requester 
under the anti-bribery provisions for prospective conduct the requester is con-
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sidering.115 Published on DOJ’s FCPA website, these releases provide valuable 
insights into how DOJ interprets the FCPA.  The vast majority of the 61 opinion 
procedures releases issued by DOJ to date were requested by U.S. companies, 
providing another avenue for U.S. companies to become more sensitized to the 
FCPA and more aware of its scope.  Further, until the passage of the 1998 
amendment expanding the FCPA’s extraterritorial application, foreign compa-
nies had good reason to believe their exposure was more limited and, conse-
quently, had less incentive to expend considerable resources enhancing their an-
ti-corruption programs.  And of course, it is human nature to focus on legal 
risks that are most proximate to the corporate headquarters.  It is understandable 
that a U.S. company would focus more on the priorities and concerns of U.S. 
enforcers than would a non-U.S. entity.
FIGURE 6, CORPORATIONS AND EXECUTIVES REACHING DOJ/FCPA
RESOLUTIONS, 1978-1996 AND 1978-2004.
Another possible explanation for the disparity of FCPA enforcement on 
U.S. versus non-U.S. companies is the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”) in 2002.  Section 404 of SOX requires issuers to evaluate and report 
on the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting.116 Pursu-
ant to SEC rules on section 404, issuers must include a report in their annual 
disclosure articulating, among other things, management’s assessment of the 
issuer’s internal financial controls, as well as any material weaknesses in the 
issuer’s financial reporting controls identified by management.117 DOJ has 
115. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2019).  
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2018). 
117. Id. at § 404.
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pointed to SOX as one of the animating forces behind increased voluntary dis-
closures to enforcement authorities.118 Voluntary disclosures can result in DOJ 
offering declinations and significant reductions in monetary penalties (up to 
50% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range).119
SOX also establishes anti-retaliation protections for, among other groups, 
employees, officers, and agents of publicly traded companies who disclose po-
tential violations of securities laws and other financial fraud laws.120 The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank”) greatly enhanced the whistleblower protections in SOX by providing 
financial incentives to whistleblowers who report information to the SEC that 
leads to a successful enforcement action.121 Whistleblower awards can be sub-
stantial, ranging from 10–30% of monetary sanctions collected by the SEC.122
The largest single award to date, announced in 2014, was $30 million.123
By virtue of their status as non-issues that do not files reports with the SEC, 
most non-U.S. companies are exempt from section 404 reporting and do not 
face the prospect of a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.124  These factors may con-
tribute to U.S. corporations voluntarily disclosing FCPA issues at higher rates 
than their non-U.S. counterparts.  From 2004 through 2018, 86% of domestic 
corporations that reached FCPA resolutions were issuers subject to section 404 
reporting requirements and Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections.  Of those, 
65% reached FCPA resolutions after making a voluntary disclosure.  In that 
same timeframe, nearly 30% of non-U.S. companies that reached FCPA resolu-
tions were not subject to section 404 reporting requirements, and only 57% of 
those companies voluntarily disclosed.  In light of the significant reductions in 
118. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of 
Greg Andres, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice) (“We are getting a significant num-
ber of disclosures from corporations about their own criminal conduct.  I think that, in part, relates 
to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which encourages corporations to review their own 
books and records.”); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Greg 
Andres, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice) (“At least one likely cause for this in-
crease in cases is disclosures by companies consistent with their obligations under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which requires senior corporate officers to certify the accuracy of their financial state-
ments.  This has led to more companies discovering FCPA violations and making the decision to 
disclosure them to the SEC and DOJ.”).
119. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice Deputy Attorney General 
Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-
delivers-remarks-34thinternational-conference-foreign.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).
122. Id.  
123. Press Release, Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Announces Largest-Ever 
Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-206#.
VCBZ4C5dUV0.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(7); 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b). 
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monetary penalties that are available in a voluntary disclosure scenario, it is 
possible that the lighter monetary impact on domestic companies is in part a 
function of SOX-prompted disclosures.
In addition, U.S. companies naturally are more likely to come onto the gov-
ernment’s radar (intentionally or unintentionally), whereas non-U.S. companies 
likely need to engage in more serious and widespread conduct to come to the 
attention of DOJ and the SEC.  And as a general matter when compared to non-
U.S. companies, U.S. companies may be more likely to earn cooperation credit 
regardless of whether they made a voluntary disclosure, on account of the deft-
ness with which sophisticated U.S. companies tend to address FCPA under the 
guidance of experienced U.S. counsel.  There have been notable recent corpo-
rate FCPA enforcement actions in which the government has criticized non-
U.S. companies for not cooperating in the investigations, leading to larger pen-
alties.125
IV. CONCLUSION
Though past criticism from President Trump, SEC Chairman Clayton, and 
others suggested that the FCPA is an unfair burden on U.S. companies attempt-
ing to do business overseas, non-U.S. corporations have felt the statute’s en-
forcement sting to an even greater extent.  This is true not only on a dollar-for-
dollar basis—for every dollar domestic companies have paid in FCPA penalties 
on average, foreign companies have paid $2.24—but also in terms of the 
FCPA’s indirect impact.  Notably, non-U.S. companies have historically been 
more likely to be subject to monitorships, post-resolution reporting, and follow-
on resolutions from overseas enforcers.  The statute’s disproportionate impact 
on non-U.S. companies has caused some foreign observers to perceive the 
FCPA as a tool of economic nationalism rather than a disadvantage to U.S. cor-
porations.  Though the FCPA has affected non-U.S. companies more acutely 
than their U.S. counterparts, the statute’s jurisdictional reach can level the play-
ing field for U.S. corporations.  Congress even amended the FCPA in 1998 with 
this motivation in mind by expanding the anti-bribery provision to reach foreign 
entities and conduct that occurred outside the United States, provided certain 
conditions are met.  Current trends suggest that future FCPA enforcement is 
likely to involve increased cooperation with foreign enforces and cross-
crediting as part of more globalized settlements.  This likely will enhance for-
eign enforcement efforts and help level the playing field with regard to compa-
125. See Press Release, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Pen-
alty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges, Department of Justice (Dec. 22, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-
resolve-foreign-bribery; Press Release, Department of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Agrees to 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and to Pay an $88 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-charges-
and-pay-88-million-fine.
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nies not otherwise subject to the FCPA.  This, in turn, may close some of the 
gap in enforcement outcomes between non-U.S. and U.S. businesses.
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